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When teaching and learning become
divorced from ends, problems ari se.

Generic
behavior
and human
conduct:
Reflections
on an
educational
dilemma
by Frederick C. Neff
Wayne Stateiver
Un
sity
Det roit, Michigan

No special
oyance
clairv
Is
required to perceive that
American education Is presen
le
tly In consider
ab disarray.
The c onfusion is partly due to piecemeal attempts to
respond to "ou tside"' or nonprofessional critics, many of
whom have urged that the schools become more flexible
In their academic and curriculum requirements, make
promot~
greater provision for individual dlf!erences,self·
ealization
and self-identi
ty,
and give greater attention to
moral and social
lu in
va es- short, that education become
less rigid and more humane. Equally vocal are those
critics who would have the schools become primarily pur·
veyors of skills and knowledge, go "back to basics," institute stricter scholastic standards, and establish more
uniform criteria of achievement. Neohumanl sts have
called for various kinds of alternative schools, while
neoconservatives have advocated more discipline and
greater regimentation within the existing school
uc· str
tu re.
But there is also a more "'sophisticated" kind of con·
fusion that emanates from among professional educators
2
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themselves who are undecided between conceiving
education as an art and conceiving It as a science-with
all the ramifications that such a choice enta
i ls. To conceive education as an art is to recog nize those "non·
scienti fic" aspects of teaching and learni ng that have to
do with theory, aims, norms and Ideals that are continually
created and reconstructed within the ongoing educational
enterprise and that do not readily lend themselves to
quantitative assessment. To conceive education as a
science is to emphasize the kinds of predictability, unlfor·
mity and precision In teaching and learning that are
characteristic o f the "exact" sciences. of which physics is
perhaps the paradigm.' What is overlooked when the
dilemma is stated in either-or terms is that education may
be viewed as neither exclusively an art nor exclusively a
science but .as a combination of both, each contributing
its proper share.
It sho
uld
go without saying that the process of
education is dependent upon the process of teaching, the
process of teaching is linked with the process of learning,
and the process of learning is shaped by the purposes for
which It is designed. Despite the apparent relatedness of
these factors, it is nonetheless possible to have been
taught without being educated and to have learned to no
purpose. One may, for example, have been taught how lo
use a screwdriver without for that reason being called
educated; or o ne may have learned a mathematical
theorem that serves no purpose In one's dally life.
Coalescence of teaching and learning with the ends that
education is designed to serve precludes artificial
fragmentation of the educational enterprise and allows for
its being conceived as a whole. It Is when teaching and
learning becom e divorced from ends that problems arise.
No tw iths tanding, attention to the nature of learn ing qua
learning is needed before its relationship to both teaching
and education can be fully understood.
I. From Mentallsm to Behaviorism
During the first two or three decades of this centu ry
psychol
ogy
was s truggling to shed Its met
aph
ical ys
garb
in order to become a " true" science. It did not wish to
remain, as its name Implied, a "science o f mind." The
classical notion of education as a matter of intellectual
development or of mind training simply wouldn't do, for
mentallsm was suggestive of nothing that was amenable
to empirical investigation. The then·current dictum that
only what was observable was a fit object of scientific
sc ruti ny led psycho logists to abandon pursuit of an
elusive mind in favor of an almost exclusive concern with
behavior. Ontological problems of being were dismissed
by contending that whatever exists at all exists In some
amount; and if It exists in some amount, It can be
measured. Recognition that mental states are nearly
alwa)'S a reflection of bodily states- for example, that eye
strain c an cause a headache, that phys
ical fatigue can
diminish mental alertness, or that a severe blow on the
head can cause amnesia-prompted psychologists to per·
ceive that mind and bo<ly are not two separate entities,
each operating under Its own independent laws, but that
they function interdependently. Attesting to such
recognition was the rise of the whole field of
psychosomatic medicine. Physiological psychology lhus
began to replace
psychology,
mentalistlc
and the notion
of a mind·body dualism was on Its way out. In its urgency
to dispose of all traces of mysticism and metaphysics and
move toward becoming a "true" science, psychology em·
braced the thesis that all human behavior was explainable
F.OU<:A l'IONAL CONSIOERA TIONS. Vol. 6. No. 1. I nil, 1978

1

Educational Considerations, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1978], Art. 3
in physiological terms. "The tendency to make
psychology a study of behavior rather than an in·
trospectlve analysis of mental states eventual ly made
considerable headway and became known as
Behaviorism.'n
Instead of being an exclusively mental affair, learning
was now understood as a process of physiological conditioning. It meant establishing neural connections by
means of which a particular stimulus became associated
with a "correct" response. Based upon the find ings of the
Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov, most cond itioning ex·
periments were performed on rats, dogs, cats, guinea
pigs, chicks and pigeons. Although John B. Watson is
generally credited as being the founder of American
behaviorism, most pioneer learn ing experiments in this
field were performed by Edward Lee Thorndike, who set
forth the thesis that learning was governed primarily by
the Law of Exercise and the Law of Effect. The Law of
Exercise accounted for the strengthening of stimulus·
response (S·R) bonds through repetition; whereas the Law
of Effect meant that neural connections were
strengthened when a response was pleasant, weakened
when it was not. Learning thus became a matter of con·
ditioning the subject (the learner) to supply whatever
response the conditioner (the teacher) deemed desirable.
Mind was either ignored entirely or reduced to synaptic
connections, and even purposes were regarded as merely
mechanical. In Thorndike's own words:
I read the facts which psychologists report about ad·
justment, configuration, drives, integration, pur·
poses, tensions and the like, and all of these seem to
me to be reducible, so far as concerns their powers
to Influence the course of thought or feeling or ac·
lion, to connections and readiness. Learning is connecting . The mind is man's connecting system. Pur·
poses are as mechanical in their nature as anything
else is!
Intelligence, insight, understanding, intention and any
sort of abstract or affective thought were placed in limbo,
for they were not d irectly
whileobservable;
the con·
ditioned response or the reflex arc, as it came to be called,
became the matrix of learning. Education thus became a
matter of conditioning, which in some areas of learning
amounted to no less than indoctrination, and the schools
were expected to turn out prespecified products in much
the same fashion as factories turn out automobiles.
II. Perception and Meaning
Behaviorism has undergone certain modifications
since the days of Watson and Thorndike. Phrases such as
"positive and negative reinforcement," "operant con·
ditioning," "Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation," "aversive
stimuli" and the like have been added to its vocabulary.
What remain, however, are the notions that (1) all behavior
is specific and identifiable in terms of its causal factors;
(2) human behavior Is essentially no different from
nonhuman behavior except in degree of complexity; (3)
human beings, like all other animals, lack freedom; and (4)
choice Is nonexistent.
What the behaviorist fai ls to recogn ize is that all
human acts are whole, and not merely the sum of their
separate parts. Fragmentation of human acts into their
sensory stimulus, ideat
lonal
and response com·
ponents- although tempting for analytic reasons-is
both arbitrary and artificial. In so far as human acts are
joined with and engaged in for a purpose, they are not sim·

ply motor responses to stimuli. The act of seeing, for
example, is all one with purposiveness. The object seen is
viewed in terms of its meaning, how it is interpreted, the
purposes for which it may be used. To see is to-see·for·a·
purpose. Viewing the Grand Canyon may mean for the
tourist seeing.for-picture·taking purposes; the geologist
may view it for the purpose of observing the erosive
processes of nature; while Ferde Grofe's "Grand Canyon
Suite" may represent its meaning to a composer of music.
No object or set of conditions constitutes a stimulus
per se. It becomes a stimulus by being caught up in the
process of ideation and response, of which it is an integral
part. Stimuli are responses in their incipient stage. Nor are
responses mere1y to stimu11;·1ney constitute stimuli trans·
formed, mediated by the motor phase of the so·called
reflex arc. Response requires a reconstitution ol stimulus,
i.e., an assignment or reassignment of meaning. A
sti mulus responded to, acted upon, undergoes trans·
formation in terms of the interpretation it is given. Nor
can any object or phenomenon be considered a stimulus
apart from the eliciting of a response or without a taking
into account of the peculiar context in which it appears. A
sudden, staccato sound is ordinarily perceived as a
stimulus. It alerts us, it annoys us, it commands our at·
tent ion. We attempt to locate and identify it, to determine
whether it is cause for alarm. But if circumstances were
such that what is ordinarily perceived as a loud noise Is
obscured by a steady drone of still louder sounds, it is
unlikely that any observable response or motor activity
would occur, in which case it would be unwarranted to call
the noise a stimulus.
Listening to high· pitched notes being played on a pie·
lo
co might be pleasing to the ear of a flutist
, and so might
be judged as pleasant. A dog hearing the same high·
pitched notes responds also, but not with enjoyment. It
gives indication that the sounds are unpleasant by
whining or withdrawing. We are wont to say that the
musician and the dog are responding d iflerently to the
same stimulus, thus dissociating stimulus from response.
But is this truly the case? Are the musician and the dog ac·
tually responding to the "same" stimulus? Or, as In lhe
first example, is the warrant of calling something a
stimulus contingent upon the presence or absence of a
response and, as in the second example, is lhe nature of
the stimulus part and parcel of the nature of both the re·
sponse and the responder? As Spinoza once observed,
"One and the same thing can at the same time be good,
bad and lndiflerent; e.g., music is good to the melancholy,
bad to those who mourn and neither good nor bad to the
deaf."•
if the synergetlc relationship between stimulus and
response Is still not clearly seen, the question might be
raised as to where a stimulus ends and where a response
begins. If no satisfactory answer to this question is
possible, the only conclusion to be drawn is that a
stimulus Is one with its response- just as a cause Is one
with its eflect and an organ ism Is one with its en·
vironment. In commenting upon the inadequacy of the
reflex arc concept, John Dewey has written:
What we have is a circuit; not an arc or broken
segment of a circle. This circuit is more truly termed
organic than reflex, because the motor response
determines the stimulus, just as truly as sensory
stimulus determines movement. Indeed, the
movement is on ly for the sake of determining the
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of fixing what kind of a stimulus It is, of interpreting It.•
This Is to say tl\at a stimulus and a response are not
separate segments of an arc but are reciprocal, each a
determinant of and determined by the other. Instead of
representing a llnear progression, they constitute a cir·
cult. In the language of Dewey:
The stimulus is that phase of the forming coord ination which represents the conditions which
e ssful issue;
have to be met in bringing it to a succ
the response is that phase of one and the same forming co·ordlnation whic h gives the key to meeting
these conditions, which serves as Instrument In effecting the successful co-ordination. They are
therefore strictly correlative and contemporaneous.•
To suppose that a given s timulus always presumes a
fi xed response Is to presuppose certainty where un·
certainty may exist. To be confronted with an uncertain
response-not to know how to respond-is to be con·
fronted with an uncertain stimulus-not to know how to
s ly elicit the
interpret It. A knock on the door ordinari
response of opening It. But if one has had a prior ex·
~rience of opening the door to an Intruder, both the
stimulus and the response take on a character of In·
determinacy. The qual itative nature of both Is in question,
and a choosing among alternatives is called for. Should
the knock be Interpreted as that of a friend (Stimulus A), In
which case the door would likely be opened (Response A);
or should it be Interpreted as the knock of an intruder
(Stimulus B), in which case the door would likely be bolted
(Response B)? Or are still o ther interpretations possible,
which might call for still o ther kinds of response? As
Dewey states it:
Generalized, sensation as stimulus is always that
phase of activity requiring to be defined in order that
a co-ordination may be completed. What the sensation will be in particular at a given time, therefore,
will depend entirely upon the way in which an ac·
tivity is being directed. It has no fixed quality of Its
own. The search for the stimul us Is the search for
exact conditions of action; that Is, for the state of
things which decides how a beginning CO·Ordinatlon
should be completed.'
To the nonplayer or the overly tired, a tennis court, racquet
and ball are not a stimulus to play tennis; to the nonsmoker, a cigarette Is not a stimulus to smoke; to the
satiated, food is not a stimulus to eat. " ... what makes
some physical thing or trait a stimulu s Is the cond ition of
the whole organism at the time, its needs and the kind of
behavior in which It is already engaged."'
Ill.

Conditioning and Intelligence
The argument is sometimes advanced that human
beings and the so·called higher animals have more in common than they have differences. Indeed, a strong case
could be made for the contention that the physio logical
equipment of all mammals Is basically the same. All
engage in eating, sleeping, locomotion, procreation, living
and dying . All likewise confront and resolve problems, i.e.,
all are capable of exercising intelligence. Although
nonhuman forms of animal Ille rely to a considerable extent upon inherited or genetically programmed behavior
patterns, commonly referred to as instinct, it cannot be
said that human behavior Is without its Instinctive com·
ponent. For present purposes, instinct may be taken to
4
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mean those special kinds o f behavior that are not a result
of learning or reasoni ng but are native to a specles-e.g.,
the web·buildlng Instinct of spiders, the nest-building instinct of birds or the storing-of.nuts instinct of squirrels.
The fact that squirrels have been observed to s tore nuts
persis tently even In regions where nuts are available the
year round tends to d iscount the notion that such
behavior is consciously purposeful or intelligently directed. It is not a result of reasoning or learning but is endemic to a species, which is largely what is meant by
calling it ins tinctive. The human infant likewise displays
such Instinctive forms of behavior as crying, reaching
and grasping, restlessness, yawning, sleeping, etc. The
homely remark that a baby is a yell at one end and com·
plate irresponsibility at the other is nonetheless descriptive o f an instinctive rather than a learned behavior pattern . However sophisticated, however subtly or grandiloquen tly manifested in adult life through the media of
art, philosophy, science and religion, it might be maintained that most human endeavors are but highly refined
ex tensions of o ur inborn tendencies to seek pleasure and
satis faction and to avoid pai n and annih ilation.
The foregoing argument has Its merits, but it also has
its share of flaws. One of Its merits consists in Its compellingly simplistic explanation of human behavior In terms
of analogous nonhuman behavior. Its major flaw lies in
a confounding of the necessary with the sufficient conditions of human behavior. Physiol ogical equipment is a
necessary requirement for thought, judgment, choice,
Ideation and the like-just as concrete and steel may be
necessary requirements for the constru ction of a building.
But physiology itself does not cons titute thought, any
more than concrete and steel themselves constitute a
building. It Is what human being s are capable or doing
with their physiological equipment that represents their
distinctiveness, j ust as what they may have decided to do
with concrete and steel constitutes the distinctiveness or
a building . As Psychoanalyst Robert Stroller puts it,
" Anatomy is not destiny. Destiny is what people make of
anatomy." Nature furnishes the raw materials, but man
creates the patterns. The fact that the physiological equipment with which we are born is a necessary condition for
intelligence Is no guarantee of how or even whether It will
be exercised. Intelligence is not an autonomous
possession of human beings which manifests Itself in
vacuo; nor can it be written off as merely responsive behavior to environing situations. What role, then, does intelligence play In the behavioristic framework?
If, in the words of Dewey, "to act wi th an aim Is all one
with acting Intelligently," It could scarcely be argued that
to respond to the strongest stimulus is all one with
responding Intelligently. Lewis Terman once defined intell igence as the ability of an organism to adapt to a new
sl tuation. In his later years he said that he reg retied having
used the term " adapt," for It suggested passive response
Instead of active control. If choice is understood to mean
dell berate selection of a preferred course of action, and if
Intelligent choice implies selection on the basis of considered ends In view, then the absence of choice-making
ability is tantamount to the absence of Intelligence. To put
the matter differently, ii by intelligence is meant the ability to choose dlscriminately among alternative courses
of action, then to the extent that ability to choose is
diminished or eliminated altogether, Intelligence Is
llkewise diminished or eliminated altogether. Whereas
selective ability-or what Darwin called " natural setecEDVCALl'IONA
RATIONS
CONS/Of
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tlon"-is a common trait of all matter and all life, at the
human level such selective ability has been sufficiently
refined as to warrant the term choice, implying that
peculiar kind of selectivity that is conscious, deliberate,
reflective and undertaken for the purpose of realizing a
foreseeable end. If by conditioning Is meant the
preprogramming of a response, then it becomes a sub·
stltute for deliberation, intelligence, and purposiveness. It
leaves out of account the "inner being" of things and
deals instead with external relationships only. If not to in·
teiligence, to what do we resort in coping with situations
for which we have no preprogrammed response?
As John Holt has rightly pointed out, "The true test of
intel ligence is not how much we know how to do, but how
we behave when we don' t know what to do."' The young
man who, having read a book on etiquette, began con·
versatlon with his girl friend by asking, "How's your
mother and little things like that?" and who started his
business letters w ith "Dear Sir or Madam as the Case May
Be:" may serve as a prime example of rote learning but
scarcely of intelligence. To suppose that conditioning will
provide for acting intelligently requires either a
redefinition of intelligence or acceptance of the premise
that life presents no uncertainties. Moreover, it is con·
celvable that persistent conditioning can lead to chronic
anxiety, flattened emotions, depression and feelings of
guilt. Men have been conditioned in some cultures to
believe that weeping in time of sorrow is an unmanly trait
that should be suppressed. Conditioning an affective
response deprives it of its genuinely emotional quality and
substitutes instead only a shallow, overt kind of behavior.
Joys and sorrows are not merely forms of behavior; rather,
they are deep-seated emotions that may or may not
manifest themselves in behavioral terms. Behavior is but
the tip of the Iceberg we know as self. To regard the tip as
constituting the whole is to construct a human
psychology that ignores all but the most trivial and overt
elements of the nature of man.
To conceive man as primari ly a responding organism
is to cast him In a passive role. Such a conception relieves
him of responsibility for his actions and excuses him tor
his failures, for he has been victimized by external cir·
cumstances or genetic endowment- or both. To conceive
man as capable of exercising initiative casts him in an ac·
tive role, responsible for the choices he makes. Both
classical
m idealis and modern existentialism have at·
tributed to humans a kind of self-sufficiency that permitted them to rise above the exigencies of circumstance.
in the language of Milton, "The mind is its own place, and
in itself/Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven." The
human mind was thought to be. autonomous, capable of
rendering itself immune to external conditions. The power
of humans through the inescapability of choice to become
what they will themselves to be is echoed by Jean-Paul
Sartre:
If man, as the existential ist conceives him, is In·
definable, It is because at first he is nothing . Only al·
terward will he be something, and he himself will
have made what he will be.... Not only is man what
he conceives himself to be, but he is also only what
he wills himself to be after this thrust toward
existence. 10
"Condemned to be free," man is at every turn of his life
confronted with choice, without which he Is nothing. Such
is the nature of the human predicament. Man becomes
human at that point in his life when he realizes that from
£DUCA TIONAl CONSIOERA TIONS. Vol. 6, No. 1,
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the burden of choosing, there is no escape. Whereas
classical idealism and modern existentialism have conceived humans as largely self-determined and self.
directed, behaviorism views them as other-determined
and other-directed. What we are accustomed to call
selfhood is nonexistent. Since there is no self as such, it
becomes nonsense to speak of self-realization, self·
actualization, self-fulfilment, or self-control. What we are
offered instead is a kind of mechanism that responds to
extraneous factors, i.e., to causes outside our control. The
self, in short, cannot act, for it is capable only of reaction-if, indeed, there be any such entity as self at ail.
IV. Was Dewey a Behaviorist?
It was stated earlier that much of the present confusion in education is traceable to indecision as to
whether education shou id be conceived as an art or as a
science-or as both. The argument might even be ad·
vanced that science itself is an art In the sense that it is an
artifact, i.e., a humanly devised, created or contrived
means for dealing with phenomena. Matters of ethics and
morality would certainly fall within the rubric of art so
defined, for they represent human constructs rather than
raw data. If by art is meant the whole ga'm ut of human
creations as distinguished from what exists in the natural
world apart from human intervention, the argument takes
on a semblance of plausibility. The so-called social sciences
in general and psychology in particular might then be
viewed from a different perspective and seen in a different
light. Obsession with measurement and quantification
might give way to concern for seeing life whole. II Is
recounted that Dewey, once found with a copy of the
Psychological Review in his hands, threw it down , exclaiming, " I despair of psychologists ! They have no understanding of what science is. They think it has to do
v1ith measuring and countlng." 11

To De"fey and other pragmatists, to be scientific in
the true sense of the term Is to be critical-minded, and
critical mindedness is not limited to physical concerns
but applies across the board. They viewed the tem1 science
in broader perspective than those who fail to see the
woods for the trees, i.e., whose preoccupation with bits
and pieces of knowledge prevents them from seeing life
whole. Both Dewey and present-day behaviorists have
rejected mentalism, or what Gilbert Ryle has called "the
myth of the dogma of the ghost in the machine."
Piecemeal and out·of-context reading of Dewey might
even suggest that he embraced behaviorism, as when he
\vrote:

... instrumentalism means a behaviorist theory of
thinking and knowing. It means that knowing is
literally something which we do; that analysis is
ultimately physical and active; that meanings in their
logical quality are standpoints, attitudes, and
methods of behaving toward facts, and that active
experimentation is essential to verification.,,.
Context aside, does the above passage qualify Dewey as a
behaviorist? The answer is that Dewey was a behaviorist
In the sense that he rejected the notion of thought as an
arcane process of noesis with no necessary issue in con·
duct, for he held that the whole purpose of thinking is to
provide warrant for a given course of action. Behaving or
acting he regarded as proving grounds for hypotheses.
Behavior Is not an end in itself but a means for testing the
adequacy of a formulated course of action, for deter·
mining the justification of a theory by observing how It
5
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works out in practice. Dewey was not a behaviorist to the
extent that he joined theory with practice, thought with ac·
lion. thus obviating any need for viewing reflection in
Isolation from behavior or behavior apart from reflection.
Whereas behaviorism has little concern for reflection to
Dewey reflection was viewed as the indispensable me~ns
for rendering action intefligent and purposeful, thus
preventing II from becoming random, accidental or blind·
while action was seen as intelligent and purposeful only
as It represented a consu mmation of thought.

and to avoid negative ones." This sounds as though it Is
"na.turat" for human beings to seek what is good and to
avood what 1s evil. Reminiscent of the romantic naturalism
of Rousseau, it Implies some sort of built-in mechanism
instinctive moral sense, or Kantian " immanence" thai
enables man to select positive reinforcements and to
avoid negative ones-the very thing that behaviorists have
elsewhere denied in claiming that all behavior is con·
ditioned behavior. Moreover, it fails to note that many experiences may be satisfying that are not at all moral, and
that many others may be unpleasant that are not for that
reason evil. Acts of brutality may be gratifying to those ol
V. Some Caveats re Social Engineering
sadistic inclination, but are they for that reason good?
Both behaviorism and pragmatism reject the notion
Acts of setf·sacrifice and deprivation may be unpleasant
of absolute human autonomy, i.e., the Idea that human
because of the hardships they entail, but are they for such
beings have some kind of inner will that enables them to
reason bad? As Max Wingo states it, " If we grant ... that
cu l themselves ott trom environing circumstances or past
goods are positive reinforcers : .. how do we know that
experience and to act in vacuo. There is a difference,
those things that reinforce us positively are really
however, between rejecting absolute autonomy and
good-that 1s, that they are desirable and worthy of being
recognizing a degree of autonomy that provides tor the
prized and sought after?'" ' The ultimate criterion that
exercise of intelligence in circumstances that are highly
Skinner employs in determining the worth of a culture is
Indeterminate and hence unpredictable in their outcomes.
survival. A culture survives to the extent that control is
Sul whereas In the writings of Dewey the role o f in·
exercised over the behavior ol Its members." In view of
telligence is nearly everywhere paramount, it Is significant
the fact that few social orders can be cited wherein
to note that virtually no mention Is made of intelligence in
greater control was exercised over the behavior or their
the writings of the behaviorists. To Dewey, the learner is
members than that which prevailed during the Nazi
brought to maturity through the cultivation of critical
regime, this appears to be a rather odd contention.
social Intelligence. Every conception of the good 1~
Perhaps Skinner had best confine his efforts to exultimately social, which is to say that it has to do with how
periments with rats and pigeons. When he undertakes to
we conduct ourselves in reference not simpl y to o ur own
pl~y social engineer, he is venturing into a domain that Is
individual or selfish desires but to the general or social
welfare; this, in turn, creates conditions whereby in· ld ual ahen to nonhuman animals, viz., culture. His social
utopias convey no profound recognition of what Unamuno
freedoms may be more fully realized. This is to
div
has called "the tragic sense of life," but appear to be spun
say that an Individual is no more or less free than the
out of a cotton.candy kind of euphoria. Nor can his
society in which he lives either restricts or protects his
utopias in any way be regarded as guaranteed outcomes
ability to exercise choice. Dewey likewise believed that
of the methods he employs; Indeed, identical methods
scientific inquiry itself is a basically moral and social un·
can be and have been used to produce and maintain
dertaking and therefore laden with moral and social
human bondage. The notion that only "good" cultures sur·
obligations.
vive-that is, that survival Is the test for the worth of a
Except in a strictly biological sense, human nature Is
culturebelied
is
by the fact that tyrannical monarchies
not given at birth; rather, it consists of those specific
oligarchies and other forms of predemocratic soctai
trails of character that have been deliberately cultivated
arrangement have a far longer history of survival than does
through the medium of education. Human beings at birth
democracy. The power of chol~e which democracy prizes
are predisposed to act neither morally nor Immorally.
has always been understood as ability to select freely
Moral conduct is learned rather than innate, and it Is
amon~ alternatives and to act accordingly. Only in
socially oriented rather than privately intuited. Nor Is that
sotuatoons where no alternative exists is choice denied as
kind of behavior that has been conditioned or Ini~ ~he drudging 1.ife of the slave or the strictured living c'ondoctrinated in accordance with some set ot rules govern·
d1toons o.f the prisoner, for such Jives require no more than
Ing "propriety" worthy of being labeled moral, for It lacks
conformity to rules already laid down. At authoritarian
the undergirdi ng of re flective accountability. In Dewey's
political levels what In simple psychological terms has
thought moral intelligence is neither reifled nor auton·
been called s ti mulus becomes the prod of brute force, and
omlzed. Rather than referring to a person as having,
response be.comes submission to the whip of authority.
owning, or possessing intelligence, Dewey prefers to
Although Skinner carefully avoids reference to tyranny 0 in
speak of an individual as conducting himself Intelligently.
rejecting all semblances of human autonomy, what he
Use of the adverbial form prevents viewing intelligence as
substitutes are external controls as formulated by
a thing or entity possessed and shifts the emphasis to Its
"enlightened" social engineers-which amounts to a
practical Issue, i.e., lo its consequences in action.
euphemistic phrasing of authoritarianism. That such a
Behaviorist B.F. Skinner, on the other hand ap·
view is sharply at odds with a fundamental precept of
parently rejects intelligence as an avenue to the good life.
democracy is illustrated in the following passage from
Distinctions between gOOd and evil are to be accounted
Dewey:
for In terms of positive and negative reinforcement.
Whatever reinforces us positivety-i.e., elicits a pleasant
Since a democratic society repudiates the principle
response-is good, moral and right; whatever reinforces
of external authority, It must find a substitute in
us negatively-1.e., elicits an unpleasan t response-is
voluntary disposition and interest; these can be
bad, Immoral and wrong. The survival of good over evil is
created only by education. But there is a deeper exthus gua~anteed in the scheme of things, for, according to
planation. A democracy Is more than a fonm of governSkinner, 11 Is our "nature" to seek positive reinforcements
ment; It is primarily a mode of associated living, of
6
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conjoint communicated experience. The extension
in space of the number of individuals who par·
tlcipate in an interest so that each has to refer his
own action to that of others, and to consider the ac·
lion of others to give point and direction to his own,
is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers
of class, race and national territory which kept men
from perceiving the full import of their activity.••

J

VI. "The Hypothesis That Man Is Not Free ..."
Frequently overlooked in discussions of Skinner's
brand of behaviorism is a key premise upon the warrant of
which much of his psychological structure stands or falls.
He states it as follows: "The hypothesis that man is not
free is essential to the application of scientific method to
the study of human behavior."" In the first place, it should
be noted that this is a hypothesis, an assumption without
proof, a provisional or suppositional statement,
verification of which has never been established. In the
second place, the assertion begs the question, for it
requires us to assume the warrant of a statement that is it·
self open to question, viz., that scientific method is applicable to a study of human behavior only If It is first
hypothesized that human beings are not free. This is
equivalent to holding that scientific study is not only ham·
pered but impossible where the object studied behaves
unpredictably, thus violating humanly formulated laws
governing its behavior. In the third place, despite inclusion of the word scientific, the statement Itself is
patently unscientific, for it flies in the face of a major
requirement of all scientific propositions, viz. , that they be
in fact or in principle testable. Untestable hypotheses for
this reason cannot be viewed as truly scientific. In the
fourth place, application of scientific method to a study of
human or any other kind of behavior would begin, not with
a prejudgment-in this case, that human beings are not
free- but with impartial inquiry. Indeed, not to do so
would be the antithesis of scientific method. In the fifth
place, the assertion is covertly prescriptive in its claim
that the hypothesis must be accepted ("is essential'')
before study of human behavior can be undertaken, and so
is hortatory rather than descriptive. It shows, to
paraphrase Bertrand Russell , that the worse your premise,
the more curious the conclusions to which it gives rise.
If human beings were not free to act in unanticipated
ways, their behavior would of course more easily lend it·
self to study and prediction. What Skinner may be thinking
is-to phrase it In the vernacular-that accepting the
hypothesis that man is not free would make the study of
human behavior a helluva lot easier. " Sit still! Don't
move!" the professional photographer often says to his
subject, meaning that the photograph wl II be clearer if the
subject engages In no unpredictable movements. The portrait painter makes a similar request of his subject. This is
suggestive of Michael Scriven 's remark that "the
logician's perennial temptation is to make the portrait
neat and perhaps the sitter will become neat."" Just as it
is easier to take aim at a non moving target, so it is simpler
to study an object that "stays put." Whether it is of the
nature of the object to stay put is conveniently Ignored. Instead of beginning with disinterested inquiry Into human
behavior, we are asked to begin with an assumption about
human nature that is not only unsupported by the evi·
dence but, indeed, is denied by it. Even so exact a science
as physics recognizes the indeterminacy of atomic particles, to say nothing of the questionableness of the
FJ\Ll, 1976
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cause-effect principle as an adequate explanation of
natural phenomena. Moreover, theorizing about human
nature is a different undertaking from studying human
behavior and, if engaged in on a scientific basis, would
properly follow rather than precede the latter.
Only a wholly static universe would be entirely pre·
dictable. Hence, predictability is related not only to sim·
plicity and mechanism but also to fixity, not to mention its
reliance upon an outmoded physics. If, as Wil liam James
once observed, ours is "a universe with the lid off," i f
universal processes are charged with novelty and
burgeoning with change, if life is an ongoing and dynamic
affair, if novelty Is in the scheme of things and not merely
superimposed upon it, then a radically different approach
to a study of human nature and life processes Is called for.
Mechanism needs to be supplanted by field theory, and
prejudicial hypotheses by inquiry. To hold that It is essen·
tial that we begin a study of human behavior by
hypothesizing that human beings lack freedom is
equivalent to assuming without question that they have
no ability to engage in acts of choice. Since the only kinds
of choice that deserve the name are those that are freely
undertaken, choice is essential to democracy, for the
ability to choose without undue restraint and to act ac·
cordingly is precisely what is meant by freedom.
If there is to be a science of human behavior-and If It
is to be truly a science and not merely an
apologetics-then it is obligated to divest itself of Its
biased premises in order to become descriptive, objective
and impartial. Inquiry into the nature of human behavior
will need to displace " the hypothesis that man is not
free," for the former is open-ended, whereas the latter
begs the question. The question, "Is man free to behave in
unpredictable ways?" Is thus bypassed; and the
hypothesis remains undisturbed. This is not unlike saying
that the hypothesis that ghosts exist is essential to
studying their behavior, thus circumventing any question
as to their actual existence. To begin with the hypothesis
that man is not free demands corollary acceptance of
human beings as capable of no more than responsive
behavior- as devoid of choice, as deprived of any kind of
self-control, and as essentially no different from
nonhumans. Yet, even a trapped animal struggles to be
free, just as animals in captivity are restricted in what they
are free to do. As the noted prlmatologist Scott Lindbergh
has observed: ' 'Monkeys in zoos are like convicts. They
have no choice in anything. And choice is essential to
keep intelligence alive. Animals are like people. They need
to be able to do things for themselves." To say that man's
most prized possession is freedom may be to use
figurative language. But it may be worth noting that such
an assertion is more often made with greater fervor and
understanding of its import by those who have ex·
perienced bondage than by those who have never been enslaved.
VII. Concerning Poets, Women, and Hens
Are human beings responsible for what they do?
What role does the self play in determining human con·
duct? Or are all human acts prompted by forces ex·
traneous to themselves, and is the term self merely a
metaphor? We shall examine these questions in greater
detail in a later section. Suffice it to say at this poi~t that
to embrace behaviorism is to accept the thesis that
selfhood is nonexistent. What we are accustomed to
calling self is simply genetic endowment plus conditioning
7
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and has no e.xlstence of its own. Human being s are thus
relieved of assuming any moral obligation for what they
do, for instead of having chosen to do this or that, their
behavior has resulted from factors over which they had no
control. Neith er saints nor sinners are responsible for
their actions; hence moral acts are no more deserving of
praise than are criminal acts deserving of condemnation.
Nor are artistic accomplishments any more suitable Ob·
jects of admiration than are diabolical schemes flt objects
of scorn. According to Skinner, " having" a poem, for
example, is essentially no different from "having" a baby.
Nor is it any different from a hen laying an egg. In each
case it is simply descriptive of a natural phenomenon for
which neither the pregnant woman, nor the "pregnant"
poet, nor the laying hen is primarily responsible. The poet
Is no more deserving of acclaim for having written his
poem than is the woman for having had her baby or the
hen for having laid its egg. "Writing a poem," says Skin·
ner, "is the sort of thing men and women do as men and
women, having a baby is the sort of thing a woman does as
a woman, and laying an egg is the sort of thing a hen does
as a hen." We are able to discover the causes of our actions " by analyzing the genetic and individual histories
responsible for our behavior.... "''
But suppose we were to choose a different cast of
characters without altering one whit Skinner's line of
reasoning. Suppose we were to say that committing
crimes is the short of thing men and women do as men
and women, becoming a prostitute is the sort of thing a
woman does as a woman, and stalking prey is the sort of
thing a wild animal does as a wild animal. And suppose we
were to add that, just as the poet had no responslblllly for
writing his poem, neither can criminals or prostitutes be
held accountable for their criminal acts or prostitution. In
the case of the wild animal, Skinner's explanation will suffice. But this Is precisely the point. The wild animal
behaves as It does because it cannot behave otherwise;
be foolish either to praise or to
would It
accordingly,
blame it. It lacks developed powers of reflection, It lacks
moral sensibility, it lacks ability to choose one course of
action over another-and so condemning its behavior
would be like condemning a tornado for its destructive
force. Having committed the genetic fallacy, Skinner then
proceeds to commit the fallacy of overgeneralization. To
suppose that because man is an animal he is therefore
nothing but an animal is to commit what the geneticist Sir
Julian Huxley has called "the nothing-but fallacy," which
results from an equation of all human traits with
nonhuman animal traits. What we are being asked to accept is that, since nonhuman animals (or, to use Skinner's
example, hens) are not responsible for what they do,
therefore human beings are equally nonresponslble for
what they do. The flaw in thi s sort of reasoning might
become more apparent if the argument were reversed,
resulting in the conclusion that, since human beings are
responsible for their actions, therefore nonhumans are
equally responsible, in which case a sow could be
arrested and brought to trial for the crime of devouring her
young. One argument has about the same amount of
credibility as the o ther-which Isn't much.
Arguments against the thesis that human beings are
absolutely autonomous in all their thoughts and actions
constitute child's play. No philosophic profundity is
required to rec~nize that we are at all times engaged in
interaction with some k ind of environment-be it
physical, psychological, religious, cultural, social or
6
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whatever-and that previous experience plays a
significant role in shaping present and future behavior.
But It is one thing to acknowledge that prior experience Is
taken into account, Is influential, becomes a contributing
factor. or has a bearing in respect to our behavior, and
quite another to hold that it predetermines our behavior. In
rejecting human autonomy, what behaviorists do, in el·
lect, is to substitute environmental autonomy. By casting
the human being in a passive role of responder, they cast
the environment (plus genetic history) in an active ro le o f
controller, overlooking the fact that abject submission on
the part of one or autonomous control on the part of the
other is virtually never the case.
If we were to fall from an airplane without a parachute
at a height of 16,000 feet, we would likely have lost control
of our destiny, and the environmental field might be said
to have taken over almost completely. In times of
catastrophes such as cyclones, earthquakes and strikes
of lightning, our powers of choice are temporari ly
minimized; and we are said to be at the mercy of the
elements. But such Instances are comparatively rare; they
are lar outnumbered by examples of man's ability to con·
trol the conditions under which he lives. Each time an
engineer constructs a dam, each time a physician In·
tervenes in the natural course of a disease, each time new
and better means of communication and transportation
are devised, human beings are playing an active role in
shaping and controlling their environments.
The concert artist who holds an audience enthralled,
the conductor whose every gesture conveys subtle nu·
ances of interpretation to an orchestra, the writer whose
literary gen ius captivates the reader, the actor or actress
whose performance is acclaimed as brilliant-all are
likewise in control of what they are doing, all are shaping
and creating a special kind of environment. In such latter
instances, the argument is not that they are absolutely
autonomous, for they must enl ist the co-operation of factors other than themselves. But they are nevertheless
exercising a significant degree of autonomy in that they
are creating, inventing, or bringing Into being a different
set of conditions than would oth erwise prevail. Human
beings both act upon and respond to their environments.
The relationship between Individuals and their environments is transactional rather than unilateral. In tact,
it Is this peculiar ability of human s to conceive and to ac·
tuallze modifications of their environments that con·
stltutes their uniqueness as human beings and thus
distinguishes them from other species.
VIII. The Concept of Self hood
Throughout our discussion the role that self plays In
this transactional process still remains clouded, perhaps
for the reason that the terms self and selfhood have yet to
be clearly defined. Behaviorism would of course reject the
notion of selfhood, just as it would discount the existence
of free will. Rejection of such terms as existences or entities, however, is not equivalent to their rejection as concepts. Behaviorism Itself is a concept In the sense that it
cannot be pointed to as "existing" anywhere. Notwithstanding, little is gained by dogmatically maintaining
that the self exists or that human beings have lree will,
and letting It go at that, without bothering to clarify what Is
meant when such assertions are made. What, then, does It
mean to say that the self exists? To exist is, in familiar
terms, to have weight and occupy space. Obviously, the
self cannot be so classified. To say that to exist means to
EOUCA TIONAL CONSIDERA !'IONS
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have temporal-spatial d imensions doesn't help much
either, for this wou ld require that the self be locatable in
time and space. The edge that the behaviorists have on
those who understand the self to exist in some
autonomous sense is that the notion of a hypostatized
self is scienti fically Indefensible. And so the behaviorist
confronts us with decid ing between discarding the self as
a discredited entity under the guise of scientific rigor, and
holding on to it in the name of some sor1 of metaphysics.
The fact is that we are not obligated to sett le for either of
these alternatives.
Just as water is not simply two·parts of hydrogen and
one of oxygen but is a liquid exhibiting properties quite
different from either of its constituent elements. just as a
child evinces qualities quite different from those of the
parents who produced him, so the self displays traits of its
own that are appreciably di fferent from whatever forces
may have contributed to Its creation. The emergence of
consciousness, moreover, suggests degrees of self·
awareness and powers of introspection that neither genes
nor conditioning can account for. What is called self
emerges from the act ive interplay of human organisms
with their environmental fields, and especially from the interaction of human beings with their distinctively social
environments. Self is neither a thing or entity possessed
nor a mere metaphor; It is an emergent function, descrip
·
tive of the various ways in which humans both respond to
and control the ambient fields in which they live, move,
and have their being. Accordingly, self may be defined as
a conceptual term denoting an individual's peculiar
awareness of his own existence in relation to the world
about him, and especially of those unique traits that set
him apart from others.
Similarly, free will is not an entity or metaphysical
substance; nor is it autonomous in the sense that it exists
in isolation from contextual circumstances. It is simply an
ill-chosen term that needs to be redefined as the power to
choose without unwarranted restraint from among competing alternatives. Since no choice deserves the name
that is not freely undertaken, it carries with it the burden
of moral responsibil ity for the consequences to which it
may lead. The fact that nonhuman animals give no indication of acting in any moral sense but behave on the
basis of Instinct, habituat io n, or condi tioni ng
necessitates the conc lusion that morality is a uniquely
human construct. Nor can any human act be dignified as
moral except as It Is an outgrowth of reflection, intention
and consideration of the desirability of all its probable
consequences.
IX. The ls-Ought Dichotomy-A Backward Look
Two final considerations are in order. The first has to
do with an attempt to clarify the relationship between
statements of fact and statements of value; the second
concerns a neglected but much-needed distinction be·
tween generic behavior and human conduct. Pace David
Hume and latter-day British empiricists and ph ilosophic
analysts,
it has become fashionable to regard empirical
assertions and valuational assertions as constituting
separate universes of discourse-commonly referred to
as the is-ought dic hotomy. According to this view, factual
(or synthetic) statements consist of assertions that can be
empirically verified; furthermore, on ly empirically
verifiable assertions may be considered to be
propositions. The assertion, for example, "It Is raining
today" is factually true in so far as evidence can be cited
f.01._JCA TJO,\
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in support of it, in so far as what constitutes evidence can
be agreed upon, and in so far as the evidence is public
ly
demonstrable. When such conditions are met, the
proposition would then "compel the assent" of any im·
partial observer, i.e., it may be said to be true. A more
technical assertion, like "E ~ MC2," would need to meet
the same criteria, with the understanding, of course, that
evidence in this case might be quasi-mathematical, and
that "publicly demonstrable" would no doubt refer to its
demonstrability to a community of Qualified physicists. In
neither case, however, could such propositions be judged
as true on any such basis as intuition, feeling or any other
sort of nonempirical "authority."
The corollary of this view is that statements of value
are of an entirely di fferent order and are traceable to
emotion rather than rooted in fact. They are regarded as
•·veiled imperatival utterances," which is to say that they
are either direct or indirect exhortations to action. "Close
the window" is an obvious exhortation to act in a specific
way, and so is neither true nor false. Sentences couched
in the indicative mood may pass as assertions of fact; but
if they conceal a value, an "ought," or an imperative, they
are said to be removed from the category of the synthetic.
The judgmental assertion, " The welfare system of this
country is in need of reform," appears superficially to be a
statement of fact It is phrased in the indicative mood. It
om its the word " ought" and seems to be an observation of
fact, of a particular state of affairs. But what is actually
being asserted, It may be argued, Is not a fact but a
feeling. What the assert ion really says is, " I feel that the
welfare system needs to be reformed," or, "The welfare
system ought to be reformed, " or, more directly, "Reform
the welfare system!"
The judgmental assertion about the welfare system
is, like all other judgments, reduced to no more than an e*·
pression of emot ion. So conceived, truth assertions
(propositions) are regarded as scientific and testable,
while judgmental asserlions (valuations) are regarded as
emotive and untestable-and never the twain shall meet.
In the words of A.J . Ayer: " . .. since the expression of a
value judgement is not a proposition, the question of truth
or falsehood does not here arise.'• . .. exhortations to
moral virtue are not propositions at all, but ejaculations or
commands which are designed to provoke ... action of a
certain sort. Accordingly, they do not belong to any
branch of philosophy or science. As for expressions of
ethical judgements, we have not yet determined how they
should be classified." "
If philosophy differs from science In any cogent way,
the difference lies In recognition of science as largely
descriptive and phenomenological and of phl.losophy as
Interpretive and judgmental. The phi losop
h er is, as it
were, an Impressionist
; while
the scientist Is a
photographer. Although appropriate distinctions may be
made, the mistake commonly made is to presume a gap or
disparity between these two domains instead of viewing
them as complementary. "How satisfying," says Mr.
Gradgrind in Dickens' Hard Times, " Is the possession ol
fact, which does away with any mystery surrounding our
daily life!"-forgetting that to know all facts and possess
no feelings is not to live at all. What does it mean? Is
everywhere the paramount question, for no factual or
descriptive statement has any significance except as It is
interpreted in some way or assigned some kind of
meaning. An out-of-context fact-i.e., a fact devoid of its
bearing upon human intE1rests and human concerns-ls
9
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utterly meaningless. Thus, the assertion that Sanskrit was
the ancient Aryan language of the Hindus of India, despite
Its fac tual accuracy, is infinitely less meaningful than that
a close friend or relative has been seriously injured in an
accident.
Like the stlmulus of our earlier discussion, a lact has
no intrinsic meaning. It assumes meaning when we judge
or interpret It in some manner, value or devalue it, assign
importance or unimportance to it, react to it in a particular
way-which is to say that facts are what they mean. To
speak of a value-free fact is to speak of a fact with no utter
significance, for meaning consists In what Dewey has
called "the emotion it stirs, the thought it sustains. " The
assertion " It Is raining today" is understood in terms of
what it means as distinguished from what It merely in·
forms. It may mean that a proposed picnic will have to be
canceled, or that crops will now have a better chance of
surviving, or that an intended visit will need to be post·
poned, or any of countless other things, each of which is
likely to be fraught with pleasure or frustration. Even so
apparently dispassionate an assertion as " E = MC2" is
modified and takes on meaning by virtue of its affective
content. It may simply mean that mass and energy are in·
terconvertible and summon visions of the benefits to be
derived from nuclear fission. Or it may symbolize the
atomic bomb, mushroom clouds, and the tragedy of
Hiroshima, and cause us to recoil in horror. All of this is
another way of saying that the moral, judgmental or
valuational content of propositions is not something
apart; on the contrary, it is precisely what endows them
with meaning, without which they have no value or
significance.
Equall y indefensible is the notion that valuational
assertions are unrooted in or somehow disconnected
from any empirically verifiable context, or that they in
some way transcend experienoe. Judgments are properly
rendered and valuations properly made only by taking into
account existing situations, i.e., facts. What ought to be
done in a particular circumstance depends upon what is
the case. "Ought" assertions are thus subject to criticism
as to their warrant in much the same way as are synthetic
assertions. To say, for example, that a street ought to be
paved would be warranted only If the facts indicated that
its present condition was unsatisfactory, that it had
chuckholes that interfered with safe driving, thal It had a
heavy flow of trartlc, etc. To say that a greater abundance
o f food is needed In a given area wou Id be warranted only
If the facts indicated that the particular area referred to
was in short supply of food. That certain things are prized,
valued and revered and that others are scorned, devalued
and condemned Is not only itself a fact but it is derived
from fact, i.e., It Is warranted by knowledge. Clean air is
prized because of the fact that It Is conducive to health,
while pollution Is c ondemned because it is known to con·
tribute to respiratory disease. The growing of vegetables
is valued because of the fact that their consumption is
necessary to a balanced diet, while malaria-carrying
mosquitoes are decried because they are known 10 be
harmful to health
.
The traditlonal argument that an "ought" assertion is
not deducible from an "is" assertion will no longer suf·
lice, not becau se It is invalid but because it substitutes
"slide-rule" logic for fruitful inquiry. It represents a
holdover from an obsolescent syllogistic or Aristotelian
sort of reasoning which is rooted not in human experience
and human alfalrs but in not much more than esoteric in·
10
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tellection . To argue that there Is utterly no relationship
between what is true and what Is valued is not only un·
w<1rranted but untenable. As Dewey has observed, "The
notion that valuation s do not exist In empirical fac t and
that therefore value·conceptions have to be imported from
a source outside experience is one ol the most curious
beliefs the mind of man has ever entertained."" He goes
on to say that
.. . at the present time the widest gap In knowledge
Is that which exists between humanistic and non ·
humanistic subjects. The breach will disappear, the
gap be filled and science be manifest as an
operating unity in fact and not merely in idea when
the conclusions of impersonal non-humanistic
science are employed in guiding the course of
distinctively human behavior, that, namely, which is
influenced by emotion and desire in the framing o f
means and ends; for desire, having ends-in-view, and
hence involving valuations, is the characteristic that
marks off human from nonhuman behavior. On the
other side, the science that Is put to distinctively
human use is that In which warranted ideas about
the nonhuman world are integrated with emotion as
human traits. In this integration not only is science
Itself a value (since it is the expression and
fulfill ment of a special human desire and interest)
but it is the supreme means of the valid deter·
mination of all valuations in all aspects of human
and social life."
Joining of the factual with the valualional is not
without its educational import. Although it may be argued
that how learning occurs is a factual question, and that
what is valued is a philosophic one, the two become lnex·
tricably interwoven when it is recognized that what is
learned and how it is learned assume significance only in
terms of ends or purposes. Of what value is such-and·such a
learning? thus overrides the question of how a partlcular
kind of learning occurs or how it is best facilitated. Ex·
perlmentatlon concerning the nature of the learning
process may yield the conclusion that, given a certain
organism and a specific set of environing cond itions, this
is the way !earning occurs. But such an assertion leaves
untouched the larger question of whether a designated
learning device ought to be used, or whether what is
learned by means of it ought to be learned at all. It is
becoming ever more apparent that an ls-ought dualism is
both tenuous and stultifying, suggesting as it does that a
fact need have no relevance to value and that a value need
have no referent In fact. Dissolution of such a dichotomy
would bring about recognition of the scientific and the
valuatlonal as reciprocal rather than as disparate
categories. It wou ld join science of learning with
philosophy of educaticn In common cause by utilizing the
knowledge that research supplies toward a real ization of
ends that are individually and socially defensible. It might
even provide for the emergence of some sort of
wholeness or coordinating principle that may enable us to
regain our educational perspective.

l

X. Generic Behavior and Human Conduct-A Needed
Distinction
It is commonplace that everyth ing that exists Is in
some sense unique. No two atoms, no two flowers, no two
snow flakes, no two sunsets, no two twins are precisely
ldentlcal. In the animal kingdom It Is the uniQue charac·
terlstlcs that various organisms exhibit that enable us to
EDUCA
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Identify them as belonging to a certain species, not·
withstanding the fact that they may share many traits in
common with other species. By contrast, to say that every
form of life and matter engages in some sort of behavior,
or that behavior characterizes all that exists, Is a loosely
grandiose rather than a sharply definitive assertion, tor It
fails to account for any uniqueness among the entitles to
which it Is applied . So used, the term behavior Is all·
encompassing, rangi ng aft the way from the actions of
subatomic particles to those of galaxies, from the actions
of amoebae to those of human beings. What Is probably
being taken Into account in asserting that all thing s
behave Is that movement of some sort Is everywhere
present - be It the slow progression of a glac
i er or the
speed of light. When the term behavior is thus used, no
distinction Is made between behavior that Is a result of an
object's being acted upon (as the case of a glacier)
and
behavior that Is self-initiated (as in the case of human
beings). Such a view tails 10 differentiate between reactive
and creative behavior. If, in reply to asking what does not
behave, we are told that nothing exists that does not
behave, then the term behavior ceases to have any
definitive meaning, tor it cannot be distinguished from
nonbehavlor. By way of analogy, if everything were w et,
dry would have no meaning; or, if there were no darkness,
light would have no meaning. Terms have meaning and
thus are definitive only as they can be differentiated from
other terms.
Does this imply that the term behavior should be
restricted to nonhuman forms of life and matter and that It
Is Inapplicable to human beings? Does it mean that human
beings do not behave? Does It discount the validity o l a
science of human behavior? Not at all. Human beings,
along with all other living organisms and physical entitles,
do act In ways that may properly be termed behavioral, If
for no other reason than that they engage in movement.
But whereas all engage in movement, and whereas many
human activities may constitute no more than movement,
all such activities fall within the rubric of noninitlated or
responsive behavior. In response to nutrients in the soil, ,
rainfall and conducive temperatures, a plant grows and
blooms; in response to proper training , a dog obeys Its
master; as a result of the pressing of certain keys, a
typewriter responds by producing typewritten words and
sentences; in noticing the changing of a traffic light from
green to red, a motorist responds by applying the brakes
of a car. All such behavior is responsive, and responsive
behavior Is as characteristic of human beings as ii Is of
nonh umans. But ii will scarcely do to conclude that
because human beings engage in responsive kinds of
behavior, therefore all human behavior Is responsive, I.e.,
that human behavior Is Identifiable in no other sense. This
would be like saying that because machinery Is used In
the manufacture of automobiles, therefore all machinery
is so used and Is Identifiable in no other sense.
Nol long ago arguments about such Issues as tree
will vs. determinism and hered ity vs. environment
dominated the educational scene. The unexamined
assumption that exclusive attachment to one position or
the other was our only option precluded consideration
that a qualified acceptance of both positions was not only
possible but reasonable. Inquiry is thwarted and
dogmatism creeps in when it is supposed that only one
point of view Is completely right and that any other is all
wrong. The mistake that behaviorists make is to conclude
that because so·calied free will cannot be relfled, man is
Fl\U. 1976
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therefore not tree, and so is Incapable of choice. What is
overlooked is that to choose Is to engage in a kind of
behavior, I.e .. that choice has Its behavioral d imensions. It
is crucial to add, however, that a "choice" that has been
predetermined is not a choice at all, for to speak of a " conditioned choice" is to employ mutually contradictory
language. Thus viewed, selective behavior is not choice itself, nor is it the whole of it; rather, It represents but the
observable tip or overt culmination of choosing. Whereas
the existentialist would have us believe that we are always
confronted with choice, the behaviorist would have us
believe that we are never free to choose. Why not say that
we experience some situations In which the possibilities
for choice are virtually unlimited anel others where they
are severely restric ted?
·
This suggests that in situations where individuals are
relatively free to control, lake charge of, or assume
responsibility for their actions, the term conduct be used,
and that the generic term behavior be applied in
describing actions and movements that are merely
responsive. One does not speak, for example, of atoms,
worms, hens, dogs, trees or stars as in any sense conducting themselves, tor their behavior Is for the most part
in response to forces over which they have virtually no
control. Even here, however, ii Is important to add that an
object itself is as much a determiner of Its behavior as are
external forces that play upon It. A marble and a wad of
chewing gum may be placed on th e same inclined plane.
Both are in the same gravitational field . Yet each responds
differently. The marble selects to roll, while the wad of
gum selects to remain in place. Such selectivity is, of
course, neither conscious, deliberate nor purposeful. It is
simply
rative
illust
that the nature of an object itself is as
much a selector of Its behavior as are the external forces
to which it responds. Selec tive ability thus understood is
characteristic of all forms o f matter; whereas choice
represents that peculiar refinement of selective ability
that renders ii reflective and purposeful, and that makes
possible a realization of foreseeable ends. According ly, in
so tar as it suggests a significant degree of conscious,
purposive self-regulation, conduct is a uniquely huma n
trail and cannot be applled lo any other form of life or matter.
We are often misled Into denying the uniqueness of
human beings by the argument that their biological and
physiological equipment Is essentially no different from
that of their nearest nonhuman relatives, all of which
display varying degrees of intelligence. But this argument
misses the point, for the distinctiveness of human beings
lies not in their physiological equipment but in the
uniquely human ways in which they are capable of putting
such equipment to use. As some geneticists maintain,
human evolution in a strictly biological sense has
probably run its course, but human evolution in terms of
the development of moral and social intelligence has
probably just begun. Mastery of the forces of nature out·
side us has outstripped our ability to master the forces of
nature within us. We have succeeded to a terrifyi ng extent
in controlling our physical environment, but we are only
beginning to learn the importance of controlling ourselves
in a moral sense. This means, first. that man 's future
evolution willlikely be in terms of developing and refining
his intellectual, moral and aesthetic powers; and, sec·
ondly, that for the first time In human history the course of
man's future evolution will be within man's collective
power to control. This is neither an optimistic nor a
11
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pessimistic observation, for i t opens up possibilities for
both dire and beneficent consequences. Impartially It
the burden of choice in regard to the kind of future
world man prefers to live in squarely on man's shoulders;
it places man in charge of his own destiny. Whatever out·
comes emerge will depend upon how human beings
choose to conduct themselves, and how they choose 10
conduct themselves w ill depend largely upon the k ind of
education to which we choose to expose them. How, then,
should education be conceived?
To ask, Whal are the purposes of education? is to ask
gless
question, for it assumes that purposes are
a meanin
ready-made, lying about, extant, waiting to be discovered.
A better question to ask would be: In light of past ex·
perience, present condit ions and fu tu re posslbllltles. how
shall we best formulate the purposes of education? This is
a perennial question . It needs to be addressed again and
again, for as conditions change and as further experience
is gained , purposes will be correspondingly modified; and
suitable answers for one generation may be unsuitable for
the nex t. This Is not to advocate a wishy-washy relativism;
nor does It mean that whatever ends have served us well in
the past must be discarded simply because they are not
new. On the contrary, ii means that no educational Ideal
can claim exemption from periodic review, and that en·
during values may as often be found worthy of retention
as innovations may be found wanting. Whether or not ii
reflects a paucity of educational thought, the tact Is that
most recent educational Innovations have appeared in the
form of t eaching and learning devices. What is lost sight
of when education Is so narrowly conceived is that no
teaching or learning device is worth its sal t that divorces .
itself from the ends It Is desig ned to achieve. Devices are
by definition means, they are instrumentalities, and so
they are not sel f·contained but are to be judged only In
terms of what ever purposes they are meant to serve.
Behavior manipulation or conditioning cannot be
faulted on grounds that It doesn' t bring results. Massive
evidence could be cited to refute such a charge. Indeed,
much of human history is an account of the conquest for
control of human thought and human behavior. But
desired results need to be carefully distinguished from
results that are truly desirable. What is merely desired
may be based upon no more than impulse, caprice, habit
or tradition, to say nothing of self-serving interests; while
what Is in fact desirable requires enlistment of powers of
reflec
on, ti
judgment and evaluation. Awareness of what is
merely desired Is shared by humans and nonhumans alike;
but formulation of what is desirable is characteristic only
of human beings, for It demands choosing among alter·
ividual
i
nd
and social
natives In regard to their long-range
benefits.
Preoccupation with fads, devices and gadgetry has
distracted us from attending to education's more Important functions. Preoccupation with behavior
manipulation has deflected our concern from the at·
tltudes, values and ideals of the learner. As a result, we
have prized not knowledge, reponslbillty, and un·
derstandlng but a semblance of them; we have forgotten
that to live without purpose is not to live in any human
sense at all. If, with Dewey, we hold that "'the ideal aim of
education Is creation of power of self·control""-and If
such aim Is taken seriously rather than as platitude-a
shift from preoccupation with behavior to concern for
conduct Is In order. Concem w ith reflection for its own sake
divorces thought from i ts practical issue in conduct, while
12
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exclusive concern w ith behavior falls to provide for its
being a culmination of reflection. Although all behavior
may be regarded as in some sense controlled, that unique
kind of behavior over which Individuals exercise self·
control and that is not exclusively shaped by factors ex·
traneous t o themselves is precisely what is meant by con·
duct.
use of the term conduct has the advantage of
distinguishing thoughtful, purposive and morally sen·
sitive activities from those that are merely accidental or
habituated. Conduct requires acceptance of responsibility
for actions deliberately undertaken as over against in·
di fferent and merely responsive kinds of behavior; it
represents a conjoining of reflec
tion
with action. In so far
as self-contro
l
is not Inborn, It Is a crucial task of
education to create, nu rtu re and develop it in individually
and socially productive ways. To learn is to grow in
powers of responsible decision -making ; and to educate is
to foster utili zation of such powers in the intelligent
con·
duct of life. All skills and knowledge are necessary means
to this end.
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